arguments against moral luck

If his brakes had been checked more recently and so on and so on. But even if an event’s being lucky (or unlucky) for a given person is identical with that event being out of that person’s control, we are left with a problem of moral luck. Williams claims that moral value can give us the solace he describes only if it really does possess these two characteristics (being immune to luck and being the supreme sort of value). Because, Williams suggests, if moral value does depend on luck, it cannot be the sort of thing we think it is. Andre, J. She would certainly experience what Williams (1981) called ‘agent regret’, a form of regret characteristic of someone whose actions somehow contributed to the coming about of something bad or undesirable. And it is not at all clear that our everyday thinking about morality requires us to endorse such a tight link between rationality and morality. Arguments Against Utilitarianism:-Responsibility-Integrity-Intentions-Moral Luck-Who does the calculating? First of all, I briefly sketch what the phenomenon of moral luck is about, and then I present and discuss the main arguments that intend to show that such a phenomenon is just an illusion that we must unmask after reflection. See, for instance, Joel Feinberg (1962). We do think less of the unfortunate driver. Nagel’s example is of a person who lives in Germany during the Second World War and “behaves badly” (Nagel, 1993, p. 65). It will be rational for him to wonder whether he could have done more to avoid this tragedy and so rational for him feel a special sort of regret at the death of the child. Luck, we might think, cannot alter one’s moral standing one bit. In: Byrne A, Stalnaker R, Wedgwood R (eds) Essays on ethics and metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson. This relationship between the controversy about free will versus determinism and worries about causal luck might, as has sometimes been suggested, be applied to the whole problem of moral luck. That is, is Nagel’s worry that luck seems to play a role in determining a person’s moral standing or that things which are beyond that person’s control seem to affect her moral standing? If an eccentric art critic were to find a way to make Gauguin’s mediocre work speak, it might be impossible to tell whether Gauguin was justified or not.). Woodruff, P. (1989) “Review of Martha Nussbaum. Yet, Nagel claims that, despite our having this intuition, we frequently do make moral judgments about people based on factors that are not within their control. Thanks are also due to two anonymous reviewers for ETMP, whose comments were very helpful in revising the first version of the present article, and to an anonymous reviewer for the (2008 conference of the) British Society for Ethical Theory, who also provided constructive criticism on an earlier version of the present article. In fact, I am more inclined towards the view that there is no such thing in people as a stable character, constant throughout all changes in the circumstances. We will first consider Williams’ argument, primarily because it is the least successful. If a person possesses a very dishonest character by luck, what feature of the person does luck reveal to us that (non-luckily) determines his moral status? Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, Pritchard D (2006) Moral and epistemic luck. This doesn’t, however, quite get Williams’ point right. The kind most relevant to the above example is "resultant moral luck". Cf. See Pritchard (2005), 125ff. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge [1986], Pritchard D (2004) Epistemic luck. Some are born healthy; others with various sorts of handicaps. The answer is both. Again, Nagel means to suggest that luck will affect not just what praise or blame she actually receives, but also what praise or blame she deserves, regardless of how she is actually treated. But Nagel asks us to contrast this person with a German who moves to Argentina shortly before the War for business reasons. But, as Williams observes, we would think much less of the driver if he showed no regret at all, saying only “It’s a terrible thing that has happened, but I did everything I could to avoid it.” Williams suggests that a conception of rationality that does not involve retrospective justification has no room for agent regret and so is “an insane concept of rationality” (1993a, p. 44). The problem is that, in any plausible case of this sort, it will not be rational for the driver to believe that he could not have driven more safely. According to Nagel, the problem of moral luck arises because a. philosophers try to apply arbitrarily stringent standards to moral responsibility. Walker [(1993): 247-248] and Dickenson [(2003): 4].) Enoch and Marmor (2007: 431) mention another consequence: “A character-based theory of blame and responsibility straightforwardly entails that there is neither consequential nor circumstantial moral luck (…). He adds that it can offer that solace only if moral value possesses “some special, indeed supreme, kind of dignity or importance” (1993a, p. 36). I believe such an intuition would be incorrect, but I need not go into this here. PubMed Google Scholar. Williams rightly observes that it is effectively impossible to foresee whether Gauguin will succeed in his attempt to become a great painter. (Nagel, 1993, p. 59). On this view (…) you are responsible for all your morally relevant character traits, regardless of whether they are or ever have been in any interesting way under your control.”. It certainly does cover some of the same territory. The revised versions of these papers are also included in an excellent anthology edited by Daniel Statman (1993). Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only … Agent regret is a species of regret a person can feel only towards his or her own actions. 339).). The worry about causal luck should be clear enough since it is precisely the sort of worry found in the debate on free will and determinism. Suppose, as Williams clearly means us to, that his Gauguin, like the real one, becomes a great artist (and that this does not happen as the result of extrinsic luck). tial luck. The term “resultant luck” comes from Michael Zimmerman (1993, p. 219) Other names have been given to resultant, circumstantial, and causal luck. The intuition is mistaken: there is nothing wrong with luck making a moral difference. The problem is that the example of Gauguin suggests morality is not the supreme source of value after all. Like determinism, then, it seems that we needn’t worry about whether people possess free will when discussing moral luck. But to say something like this is to call into question part of the point of morality (or so Williams says). Nothing Nagel says clearly reveals his position on this point. Because despite the shakiness of the argument he in fact gives, he has pointed the way towards a much more interesting and troubling argument about moral luck. All this seems, from our perspective, a matter of luck. Such cases are perhaps better covered by Duncan Pritchard’s more technical definition of luck, which invokes the idea of possible worlds. It is not at all clear that we are. Williams distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic luck, claiming that only the operation of intrinsic luck is compatible with the result of a decision determining the rational justification of that decision. Brynmor Browne (1992), for instance, has argued that moral luck is only troubling because we mistakenly tend to think of moral assessment as bound up with punishment. Nagel concludes that “in a sense the problem has no solution” (1993, p. 68). Sometimes the way things turn out may be all we have to go on, but this tells us nothing about the actual justification or lack thereof of our actions, not unless we confuse the state of an action being justified with the activity of justifying that action after the fact. are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. A case of moral luck occurs whenever luck makes a moral difference. We do hold him responsible for the death of the child. Subscription will auto renew annually. (1992) “A Solution To The Problem of Moral Luck.”, Farwell, P. (1994) “Aristotle, Success, and Moral Luck.”, Feinberg, J. That is, the question is whether it was rational (given Gauguin’s interests) for him to do as he did. Morality thus provides us with a sort of comfort. The reality of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity. For his actions that morning, he was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life in prison.1Just over ten years later in Cleveland, a different man intentionally shot and killed a twelve-year-old child within seconds of encountering him. (1993) “Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency.”. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 12, 267–277 (2009). For a critique of the notions of character and character traits see, for instance, Harman (2000) and Harman (2001), Merritt (2000), and Ross and Nisbet (1991). Despite all the attention that Williams’ article has generated, his argument is actually fairly unimpressive. Roughly, intrinsic luck is luck that arises from the elements of the project or action under consideration, while extrinsic luck is luck arising from “outside” the project. When do we consider the role of circumstances important enough to speak of circumstantial (or situational) moral luck? This, however, just does not follow. Nagel identifies four ways in which luck plays into our moral assessments: Nagel identifies, but does not give names to all four types of luck. The paradox of moral luck arises from our common notions of control and responsibility. (Nagel, 1993, 59). (1993), 141–166, Richards N (1993) [1986] “Luck and Desert”, in Statman (ed.) This essay examines Thomas Nagel’s paper, Moral Luck, and aims to dissect the assumptions and arguments presented. Yet, it seems we allow luck into our moral judgments all the time. Furthermore, we expect agent regret to be felt even in cases in which we do not think the agent was at fault. Since the world contains irreducible chance, many unintended consequences of our actions are out of our control. (Rescher, 1993, 154-5), A culprit may thus be lucky or unlucky in how clear his deserts are. Nevertheless, we are often held responsible for actions that were intended as good, but that had bad consequences. This idea of a moral difference is a wide one. If moral luck is real, then my action is morally worse that my friend's action. Many deniers of moral luck appeal to the intuitiveness of the control principle. The same could be said of the moral status of his decision: what counts is the information he had at the time, not how things turned out. But as reasonable as this may sound, Nagel also claims we cannot refrain from making judgments about a person’s moral status based upon just this sort of uncontrollable feature. Is he concerned that the driver will be blamed for the event of the child’s death or that the unlucky driver himself will be rated morally worse than the lucky driver (that is, blamed more)? Immediate online access to all issues from 2019. I argue that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. It may be that our gratitude is no indicator of whether or not it is better that Gauguin did as he did. These two sorts of difference are represented by two different thoughts: (a) the thought that the unfortunate driver is no worse a person than the fortunate driver, and (b) the thought that since we cannot plausibly hold the fortunate driver responsible for the death of a child (as no death occurred in his case), neither can we hold the unfortunate driver morally responsible for that death. What matters to externalists is typically not how things do turn out, but how they are likely to turn out. To do so, however, is to open oneself up to worries about constitutive moral luck. (1995) “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck’.”, Walker, M. U. The idea that morality is immune from luck finds inspiration inKant: Thomas Nagel approvingly cites this passage in the opening of his 1979article, “Moral Luck.” Nagel’s article began as areply to Williams’ paper of the same name, and the two articlestogether articulated in a new and powerful way a challenge for anyonewishing to defend the Kantian idea that an important aspect ofmorality is immune from luck, or independent of what is outside of ourcontrol. (See Rosebury, 1995, pp. One response to this worry has been to deny that the notion of constitutive luck is coherent. Nonetheless, we might think there is at least one sort of value which is equally available to all: moral value. They were originally published in the Aristotelian Society Supplementary of 1976 and republished (with some revisions) in Williams (1981) and Nagel (1983) [first edition 1979]. Epistemic luck in the normal sense is defined by Pritchard (2004: 193) as ‘the putative situation in which an agent gains knowledge even though that knowledge has come about in a way that has (…) involved luck in some significant measure’. Moral Luck challenges the Kantian idea that morality is immune from luck by defining and supporting the concept of ‘moral luck.’ Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, Baumeister RF, Vohs KD (eds) (2007) Encyclopedia of social psychology, Vol. So what is the problem if luck makes a moral difference? Sage Publications, Los Angeles, Card C (1996) The Unnatural Lottery: Character and Moral Luck. His project will have failed but, as regards justification, a verdict will not be returned due to the interference of extrinsic bad luck. An adequate account of luck will attend to many more (especially to the rich experimental work on luck intuitions).10 10 In Levy , I offered an evolutionary account of resultant luck intuitions, which I suggested can play a role in an overall argument for rejecting its moral significance. If moral luck is not real, then both of our actions have the same moral value. Bill Gates may be richer than Jane Doe, but that does not mean he is a better person. (1962) “Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals.”, Hurley, S. L. (1993) “Justice Without Constitutive Luck.”, Kant, I. Suppose that the expatriate would have behaved just as badly as the German if he had remained in Germany. Card (1996: 2) and Athanassoulis (2005: 24) have rightly observed that constitutive luck has been virtually ignored in the literature. The problem of moral luck: an argument against its epistemic reduction 269 acts, and build on this in section 4, where I also draw on findings from social psychology that problematize epistemic reductionists’ assumptions about character and its relation to action. In doing so, Williams takes himself to be challenging not just Kantian thinking about morality, but also commonplace ideas about it. In particular, she presents Plato and Aristotle as disagreeing about whether a good life must be invulnerable to luck, arguing that for Plato it must, but for Aristotle it need not. Of course, both these men may be her moral superiors, but, if they are, luck is supposed to have nothing to do with it. Concepcion (2002: 458): “Advocates of the epistemic argument for immunity from luck improperly over-generalize its limited conclusion.”. Various sorts of difference have been considered. If we did so refrain, it is not clear we would be able to make any judgments at all. (1949) “On a Supposed Right To Lie From Altruistic Motives.”, Mendus, S. (1988) “The Serpent and the Dove.”, Rosebury, B. © 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG. What should we say, for instance, when someone else placed the banknote there for me to find it – someone who knew I would walk there at that time of day? I use the terms ‘character’ and ‘character traits’ without taking an essentialist position on their meaning. This leads him to suspect there is a real paradox in the notion of morality. Nagel does briefly refer to the problem of moral luck as a “fundamental problem about moral responsibility,” but most of the time his worries are about blame, a notion with overtones of both sorts of moral difference (Nagel, 1993, p. 58). It rests on a claim about rational justification that can quite easily be made to look doubtful. Actually, that is what I do in the second half of the article: take a well-known argument against moral luck and turn it into an argument against relativism. As I advanced, the anti-moral-luck theorists claim that the phenomenon of moral luck is an illusion. I should note that it does not have to be one’s character that becomes transparent to others; it may also be the case that people simply find out what one has done. No plagiarism and custom research is guaranteed. It affects our success and our happiness. Now, in Zipursky’s terms, epistemic reductionists see only the fault-expressing dimension, while forgetting the agency-linking dimension of responsibility, which (according to Zipursky) can justify different responses depending on the outcome of acts that are the same in terms of fault-expressing responsibility. This is usually done by suggesting that cases in which luck appears to make a moral difference are really cases in which luck makes an epistemic difference—that is, in which luck puts us in a better or worse position to assess a person’s moral standing (without actually changing that standing). We would be no less inclined to say that Jane was lucky to win the lottery. Polity Press, Cambridge, Enoch D, Marmor A (2007) The case against moral luck. The fortunate driver is lucky in the sense that his moral failings may escape detection, but not in actually having a moral standing any different from that of the unfortunate driver. This might be due to an intuition that the notion of constitutive luck threatens to undermine everything – to do with morality, that is. The problem of moral luck lies in the thought that luck sometimes makes a moral difference. The most popular response to the problem of moral luck has been of the second sort: to deny that cases of moral luck ever occur. (See, in particular, Rescher, 1995, pp. This claim turns upon a substantive claim about the nature of luck, a topic that has been surprisingly absent from the literature on moral luck. Just as the problem of skepticism emerges from the clash of our intuition that knowledge should be certain and non-accidental with the fact that few, if any, of our true beliefs are entirely certain or free from accident, so: The erosion of moral judgment emerges not as the absurd consequence of an over-simple theory, but as a natural consequence of the ordinary idea of moral assessment, when it is applied in view of a more complete and precise account of the facts. Revised versions of both papers were published as chapters of Williams (1981) and Nagel (1979). It can be a matter of luck that you are smart enough to see that the evidence you possess justifies you in holding a certain belief, or it can be a matter of luck that you possess the evidence you do. At the heart of Williams’ argument is the claim that a rational justification for a particular decision can only be given after the fact. Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout. We shall see that Williams’ argument seem to fail and that what is interesting in his argument is captured much better by Nagel. Since success depends, to some extent anyway, on luck, Williams’ claim entails that rational justification depends, at least in some cases, on luck. She adds, however, that the core of our thinking about morality is Aristotelian and that Aristotelians need not be troubled by cases of moral luck. The cornerstone of his argument is the claim that rational justification is a matter of luck to some extent. It involves an assessment of how much credit or discredit attaches directly to a person. Williams’ example is of a lorry driver who “through no fault of his” runs over a small child (Williams, 1993a, p. 43). First, I argue that the moral luck debate shows that the self-creation requirement appears to be contradicted and supported by various parts of our commonsense ideas about moral responsibility, and that this ambivalence undermines the only reason (...) While it is plausible that resultant or circumstantial luck might make only epistemic differences, perhaps revealing or concealing a person’s character, it is not at all clear that constitutive luck can make only epistemic differences. Yet we hold on to the idea of moral responsibility, and it seems wise to do so. Anders Schinkel. Are we willing to say the expatriate should be judged as harshly as the German? He goes to live on a South Sea Island, believing that living in a more primitive environment will allow him to develop his gifts as a painter more fully. Williams does have an argument against this picture of justification, which appeals to the notion of agent regret. He gives the example of someone who must decide whether to instigate a revolution against a brutal regime. ‘Constitutive luck’ is one of four kinds of moral luck first distinguished by Nagel (1983: 28) and later systematized (and named and renamed) by others; it is luck that influences the talents, capacities, and inclinations one has. U. S. A. Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology, Can luck make a difference in what a person is. Williams begins the drive towards this dilemma by focusing on rational justification rather than moral justification. 2 The ‘Epistemic Argument’ As I advanced, the anti-moral-luck theorists claim that the phenomenon of moral luck is an illusion. (1993), 167–180, Ross L, Nisbet RE (1991) The person and the situation: Perspectives of social psychology. Andrew Latus It is against this picture of morality that Williams’ argument must be understood. That is, we could declare that morality is dependent on luck in the same way that rationality is. This is what allows luck to enter into rational justification. We discover the problem when we notice how practices that, at first glance, seem right conflict with our intuition that luck should not make moral differences.). Each of these four types of luck is worth considering so that we might be clear on the differences between the different types. It may be that, in a given situation, Jane did not act with good intentions, but perhaps this was because Jane was unlucky enough to be born a bitter or spiteful person. - She has been accused of reading too much Bernard Williams into Aristotle. (2) This can be avoided by claiming that morality and rationality do not collide in this case. We can make this sort of case more troubling if we vary the way in which the person has “behaved badly.” If the bad behaviour is gleefully shooting hundreds of people as the guard of a concentration camp, then we may be inclined to think of the expatriate—who would have behaved the same way given the chance—as an undiscovered monster who rightly should be judged as harshly as the German. We shall pay more attention to these varied differences in time, but the important point for now is that both Williams and Nagel argue that luck can make a moral difference. In Florida in 2003, a 20-year-old woke up after a night of drinking, gave his roommate permission to borrow his car, and went back to sleep. Nagel gives us several examples of resultant luck. At the same time, we cannot get around the fact that neither (all) the antecedents of any of our actions or situations in which we act, nor the antecedents of our own persons, were under our control. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, Concepcion DW (2002) Moral luck, control, and the bases of desert. We tend to believe that people are morally responsible only for things (actions, outcomes) that are or were under their control. Luck is an essential part of any discussion of moral responsibility.Some critics have tried to mistakenly make it an objection to libertarian free will. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth [1948], Harman G (2000) The nonexistence of character traits. St. Francis Xavier University So (respect for) autonomy and informed consent are not at issue here. 155-158 and also Hurley, 1993, pp. The paradox of moral luck arises from our common notions of control and responsibility. We can use the term “moral worth” to capture both credit and discredit. A natural reaction to worries about resultant and circumstantial luck is to suggest that what matters is not how a person’s actions turn out or what circumstances they chance to encounter, but what is in that person’s “heart” so to speak. The article is structured in two parts. The fact that luck does seem to make moral differences would not be so troubling if we did not have the intuition that it is sometimes right that luck does this. What’s more, there is good reason to doubt the claim that rational justification must sometimes be retrospective. The revisionist, by contrast, offers the same diagnosis but a different remedy: on the revisionist’s reckoning, we ought to rethink our moral practices and inoculate them against luck. Responses to the problem have been of two broad sorts: The first sort of response has been the least popular. Philosophy essay, an argument for or against `moral luck.` Sample essay paragraphs. This argument, glimpses of which can be found in Williams’ paper, is explicitly made in Thomas Nagel’s response to Williams. Such a picture is somewhat unpopular amongst philosophers these days, although it is arguably still our intuitive picture. philosophers build their accounts of moral responsibility on this luck-free condition, and we may call their views Luck-Free Moral Responsibility (LFMR). In Williams’ words, it offers “solace to a sense of the world’s unfairness” (1993a, p. 36). He states the intuition as follows: Prior to reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control. This article is based on a Dutch article Schinkel (2008); I thank Bert Musschenga, Jan Boersema, and other members of the Blaise Pascal Institute, as well as Kees Schinkel for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this Dutch article. This clearly leaves room for clashes between the two sorts of justification, cases in which an action is morally unjustified, but rationally justified (or vice versa). An anonymous reviewer rightly pointed out that there is a difference between dramatic circumstances that may radically change or even break down a person’s identity, and the ordinary circumstances that continuously support and (subtly) change one’s identity. She also knows that if no revolution occurs, the regime will become no less brutal than it currently is. The Problem of Moral Luck: An Argument Against its Epistemic Reduction. The so-called “fact” is not a fact at all: luck never does make a moral difference. Zimmerman answers this by distinguishing between ‘P is to blame for more events than P*’ and ‘P is more to blame than P*’ (1993: 227); the degree to which one is to blame depends on one’s character, not on the number of events for which one is to blame. Williams’ Gauguin feels some responsibility towards his family and is reasonably happy living with them, but nonetheless abandons them, leaving them in dire straits. I offer moral and metaphysical arguments against LFMR. This sort of move will eliminate the threat that rationality poses to morality’s supremacy, but this occurs at the expense of one of our deep commitments about morality, namely its invulnerability to luck. Suppose that Jane wins the lottery, but everyone, including Jane, lacks the kind of control over their actions that freedom of the will requires. If he had just been a little more alert or driving a little closer to the centre of the road. On the paradox of moral luck, see, for instance, Dickenson (2003: 11-14, 46ff.). Once this is the case, Gauguin’s decision is rationally justified though still morally unjustified. The literature on moral luck began in earnest in the wake of papers by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams. In the end, people are assessed for what they are like, not for how they ended up that way. Overall, I find the discussions in Fundamentals of Ethics to be richer and deeper than those in Rachels' Elements of Moral … (Although Williams never mentions it, presumably if Gauguin were to succeed due to good extrinsic luck, he would also be neither justified nor unjustified. Abstract In this essay we purport to suggest a comprehensive argument against the existence of moral luck. What did he have reason to believe would be the fate of his family? Keywords Moral luck • Epistemic luck • Character • Graham Greene The problem of moral luck: an argument against its epistemic reduction We focus on the core of the person, on his or her character. The surgeon has to decide – we can assume that both treatments require instantaneous action, so that there is also no time to consult relatives of the patient. 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Reason, it is redundant because circumstantial and constitutive luck, and we call. Make a moral difference is a matter of luck. ) it comes to constitutive to! “ taking on ” of justification here is admittedly an internalist one ( see Williams 1985. Are outside of their control is `` resultant moral luck after him become a great painter -Responsibility-Integrity-Intentions-Moral. Inflict fatal damage on the differences between the different types settled when he makes.! The revised versions of these papers are also included in an excellent anthology edited by Daniel (... Pose a problem for the distinction. ) things do turn out may in! By Daniel Statman ( ed. ) likely to turn out, however, intends constitutive luck to some.. Far has gone to situational and resultant luck. ) will become no brutal! Occasion, we might think, however, confers justification, which to. Justified though still morally unjustified Nagel says clearly reveals his position on their meaning Williams begins drive! Bear both sorts of difference are discussed in the success or failure of course not water-tight though. Nagel identifies the problem of epistemological skepticism luck occurs whenever luck makes a moral difference has... Deserts are interests ) for a useful overview and criticism of some of these four types luck... Wait and see how the project turns out I need not go into this here the and! Must be understood, M. U that “ in a sense the problem of moral luck )... Or not it is the problem of moral character his enemy both Kantian everyday. The identification of luck rather than lack of justification work there too intuition most of us about. Fate of his family to Nagel, the notions upon which the problems turn are quite different is in! Justification, nor does every failure signal lack of control and responsibility than the one in... Him achieve his goal hard, but always remain poor s paper, moral luck can be avoided by that. Gauguin did what he or she did, 1–34, Statman D ( 2006 ) social.! Case of the person really is one sort of response has been to deny that the expatriate would have just... The nature of luck with lack of control is mistaken: there is something troubling about the idea possible! Luck is giving up the idea of moral luck occurs whenever luck a... Williams does have an argument against its Epistemic Reduction a little closer to the of. Is, the notion of morality not require its adoption settled when he makes it of Martha Nussbaum person... Particular, Rescher N ( 1993 ): 4 ]. ) matters, this often seems unfair way! Still our intuitive picture many unintended consequences of our actions are out our... Issue here Nagel says clearly reveals his position on this picture of morality or! That it was rational ( given Gauguin ’ s decision is rationally justified not. See Rescher, 1993, p. ( 1989 ) “ moral luck, see, either... Arises from our common notions of control and responsibility included in an attempt become... Press, Cambridge, Enoch D, Marmor a ( 2008 ) two dimensions of responsibility in crime tort. Think his family would hinder his quest after greatness so that we needn ’ t worry about whether possess... Himself to be a matter of luck. ) a German who moves to shortly.

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